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lyric context of Inferno v is a great deal richer and more com- 
plex than the routine citations of Guido Guinizzelli's Al corgentil 
rempaira sempre amore vis-a-vis Francesca's Amor cWal corgentil ratto 
s'apprende would suggest.1 While we have integrated Francesca's self-con- 
gratulatory exploitation of Guinizzellian principles on love and inborn 
nobility into our reading of Inferno v, her blatant citational tactics seem to 
have obscured the importance of the lyric tradition for other parts of the 
canto. I will attempt in this essay to cast a wider net with respect to 
Inferno v and the Italian lyric tradition, and to explore how Dante fashions 
the canto as a meditation on that tradition and that discourse - quint- 
essentially a discourse of desire. 
The choice of a lyric context for the treatment of lust is in itself unusual 
and should not be taken for granted; it is important to note that a treat- 
ment of lust need have little or nothing to do with a discourse of desire. 
The souls of Canto v are explicitly defined as peccator camali, and yet 
Dante's treatment of them differs enormously from the treatment of carnal 
sinners in vision literature or in moral didactic poetry like that of Bonvesin 
da la Riva. The visions give us a richer sense of the cultural options 
available to Dante as he designed his underworld and thus provide a con- 
text which, though typically ignored by the Commedicts commentators, 
both ancient and modern, is extremely useful for putting what Dante does 
in perspective.2 
The visions tend to treat the sins of incontinence with particular asper- 
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ity and cruelty; Dante instead treats them with comparative mildness. 
Most significant is the "obsession with sexual sin, such as adultery, forni- 
cation, promiscuity and sodomy" that runs through vision literature 
and that is essentially absent from the Commedia.3 Dante, after all, places 
Cunizza da Romano, a scandalous adulteress, in Paradise, along with 
Rahab, a prostitute; he puts Thai's, another prostitute, among the flatterers 
with an emphasis that is more rhetorical than sexual, and even treats sod- 
omy as equivalent to heterosexual indulgence in Purgatory. One could 
argue in fact that the most perversely "sexual" passage in the Commedia is 
the grotesque copulation of man and snake in Inferno xxv, a canto that 
treats not lust but the sin of fraudulent thievery. By the same token, the 
most sexual word of Inferno v may well be "coda," referring to the tail 
used by the infernal judge, Minos, to indicate the circle to which the 
damned soul is to be sent: "cignesi con la coda tante volte / quantunque 
gradi vuol che giu sia messa" (Inf. v,ll- 12). The phallic connotations of 
coda, already present in Horace and Cicero and familiar to us from the 
Decameron, were evident to the illustrators of the Commedia, who fre- 
quently show Minos's tail appearing phallically from between his legs.4 
However, even given the very definite phallic implications of Minos's 
tail, Dante's treatment of lust is remarkable not for how sexualized but for 
how desexualized it is. Again, the visions demonstrate to what degree 
Dante, by contrast, could be said to desexualize lust, even - despite the 
presence among the lustful of the Commedia s second most famous fe- 
male - to degender it.5 Compare, for instance, Tundale's Vision, written 
in 1149 by an Irish monk, where the punishment of the fornicators is 
revoltingly gendered. Not only does the punishment take the gendered 
form of an obscene pregnancy, but the men who suffer this affliction incur 
what is clearly perceived as the further degradation of being effectively 
made into women: 
All of the men and the women who descended into the swamp were actually 
made pregnant by the beast. In this condition they waited harshly for the time 
agreed on for their departure. The offspring they conceived stung them in their 
entrails like vipers, and so their corpses were miserably churned in the fetid waves 
of the frozen sea by icy death. And when it was time, so that they were ready, 
they filled the depths crying with howls; and so they gave birth to serpents. 
I say not only women, but also men, gave birth to them, not through the part 
that nature constructed suitable for such a function, but through their arms, just 
as through their breasts, and they went bursting out through all their members. 
(Gardiner ed., 169-170) 
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Likewise, the deflected and literary nature of Canto v, so frequently 
noted, comes into a more telling relief when we consider the adulterers in 
Thurkill's Vision (dated 1206, of English provenance), who must fornicate 
publicly in an infernal amphitheater, and then tear each other to pieces: 
An adulterer was now brought into the sight of the furious demons together with 
an adulteress, united together in foul contact. In the presence of all they repeated 
their disgraceful love-making and immodest gestures to their own confusion and 
amid the cursing of the demons. Then, as if smitten with frenzy, they began to 
tear one another, changing the outward love that they seemed to entertain 
toward one another before into cruelty and hatred. Their limbs were torn to 
pieces by the furious crowd all around them, and they suffered the same punish- 
ments as those who had preceded them. All the fornicators who were also present 
were tormented in the same way, and the intensity of their sufferings was so 
great that the pen of this writer is not adequate to portray them. (Gardiner ed., 
230-231) 
It goes without saying that Francesca and Paolo do not fornicate in 
public; or, rather, although it has always gone without saying, saying it 
forces us to envision the possibility of a very different text. In Dante's 
text, in the text he chose to create, the lustful do not perform a degraded 
act of love for the pilgrim and his guide. At the same time, the presence 
of Vergil's Minos in Canto v alerts us to the Aeneid as a frame of reference 
and prompts us to note that Dante is harsher to Francesca than Vergil is 
to Dido. We have moved from a context that Dante did not choose to 
evoke (the visions) to one that he did (the Aeneid): Dido, who killed 
herself when abandoned by Aeneas, is a touchstone of Canto v, figuring 
the love-death nexus that is at the canto's core. Dante's description of the 
Phrygian queen as "the one who killed herself for love" ("colei che s'an- 
cise amorosa, 61) recalls the "Fields of Mourning" of Vergil's underworld, 
where Dido dwells among those "whom bitter love consumed with bru- 
tal waste."6 The proximity between Minos and the unhappy lovers in the 
Aeneid (the "Lugentes Campi" are separated from Minos by only six 
verses) sheds light on the controversial decision to place Minos at the 
threshold of the second rather than the first circle of hell:7 as Vergil's 
Minos paves the way for Dido, so, I suggest, Dante's Minos paves the 
way for Francesca, who is marked as Didoesque, coming to the pilgrim 
from Dido's cohort- "la schiera ov'e Dido" (85).8 
This suggestive symmetry brings us back to the key difference insti- 
tuted by Dante between his Minos and Vergil's; it brings us back to that 
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coda. The tail is a Dantesque addition to the figure of the infernal judge as 
presented in Aeneid vi, a feature that Dante uses to connote something 
about his hell that is lacking in Vergil's somber, even tragic, but much 
more static and monochrome vision.9 Minos's tail is an early signpost in a 
web of signifiers extending all the way to Lucifer's thickly-piled hide, a 
web that serves to conjure a hell that is densely corporeal, viscously physi- 
cal, verbally foul - in short, much more degraded and degrading than 
anything Vergil has to offer. In Inferno v Dante follows Vergil - creating 
an analogy between Francesca and Dido that includes their structural con- 
tiguity to Minos - as part of the complex interplay whereby he both ap- 
propriates from his precursor (even the pairing of Francesca with Paolo 
has its forerunner in Aeneid vi's pairing of Dido with Sychaeus, to whom 
Dido turns after she spurns Aeneas) and deviates from him, in this case by 
imposing much sterner conditions on his lovers than does Vergil. Dante 
uses Vergil to deviate from Vergil, in that it is precisely Minos, as refash- 
ioned by Dante, who marks the degree of difference between Vergil's 
"Lugentes Campi" and the second circle of hell. If we compare Dante's 
handling of the lustful to the Aeneid on the one hand and to the visions 
on the other, we see that he steers a middle course: much harsher than 
Vergil, he uses his Minos's phallic tail proleptically to carnalize the figure 
of Francesca and to offset her romanticizing; at the same time he is infi- 
nitely less brutal than the vision writers, compared to whom he offers a 
romanticized portrait of lust. 
While the visions emphasize sex itself as degraded and sinful, and sub- 
ject carnal sinners to degrading and sexualized punishments, the contra- 
passo fashioned by Dante in Inferno v - where the lustful are tossed by the 
hell-storm as in life they were buffeted by their passions - emphasizes the 
psychology of desire. The story that Francesca relates mirrors the contra- 
passo, for it too is exquisitely psychological: she offers no extenuating 
circumstances to justify her behavior, not the deceitful father or proxy 
marriage later added to her story by Boccaccio,10 just the overwhelming 
force of overriding passion. Desire compels her, and she sins. That is the 
essence of her story, and it is one that foregrounds the key philosophical 
issues at stake here for Dante, issues of compulsion and the will, already 
condensed in his definition of carnal sinners as "those who subordinate 
reason to desire": "i peccator carnali, / che la ragion sommettono al talen- 
to" (Inf. v, 38-39). n Reason struggles with desire, and in Francesca's case 
desire triumphs. Her discourse of justification engages a deeper logic than 
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Boccaccio's circumstantial inventions: her point, reflected in her very 
syntax, is that desire cannot be withstood. Dante is passionately invested 
in the belief that desire can be withstood, that reason can and must tri- 
umph, and it is this profoundly psychological and ethical drama, with 
deep roots in the courtly tradition, that is ultimately played out in his 
treatment of lust. 
Moreover, the contrapasso that Dante fashions for lust may well have 
benefited also from Aristotle's discussion of compulsion and the will in 
The Nichomachean Ethics. In a passage that has not, to my knowledge, been 
brought to bear on Inferno v, Aristotle illustrates compulsion by offering 
precisely the example of a person being carried by a wind: "Those things, 
then, are thought involuntary, which take place by force or owing to 
ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is out- 
side, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who 
acts - or, rather, is acted upon, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, 
or by men who had him in their power" (Nich. Ethics 3.1; italics mine).12 
Francesca, who speaks of her past actions as involuntary, of her self as 
having been acted upon rather than acting, and who is now carried by a 
wind, is the perfect embodiment of Aristotle's example; we could say 
that she is Aristotle's example of compulsion transplanted to the Christian 
afterlife. What for Aristotle serves as an example of compulsion - the ex- 
ample of a person being carried by a literal wind - becomes in Dante's 
afterworld a contrapasso, that is a metaphor - in this case a windy tempes- 
tuous passion - that has been fashioned into a literal feature of Dante's 
infernal landscape. Aristotle's literally compulsive wind has become the 
bufera infernal: it has become the tempest that represents the passions that 
Francesca calls compulsive but that Dante believes can and must be with- 
stood by reason. 
We have extended the frame of reference for this contrapasso to take 
in visionary and classical contexts, in the latter case even intertexts, both 
definite (Aeneid) and possible (Nichomachean Ethics). A further context is 
offered by the fourteenth-century commentator Guido da Pisa, whose 
gloss of the contrapasso - "the lustful are moved in this world by every 
wind of temptation, so that their souls are always in continual motion and 
continual tempest" - moves him to cite Isaiah: "Cor impii quasi mare 
fervens quod quiescere non potest" ("The heart of the wicked man is like 
a troubled sea that cannot rest" [Isaiah 57:20]). 13 Beyond the suggestive 
comparison of the human heart to a turbulent sea, which resonates in 
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Canto v's description of the circle of lust as a place "che mugghia come 
fa mar per tempesta, / se da contrari venti e combattuto" (28-30), we 
note the verb quiescere, whose Italian synonyms are found throughout 
Inferno v, and indeed throughout the Commedia. The constellation 
quiescere I restate I posare inevitably invokes yet another philosophical con- 
text for the canto, for this is the language of the Augustinian analysis of 
desire, based on a counterpoint between human motion and divine re- 
pose, the human cor inquietum with its restless and unfulfilled longings 
versus the eternally fulfilled quies of God.14 The language and psychology 
of Augustine's analysis of human desire saturate not only the Commedia, 
but also the linguistic and metaphoric systems of the lyric tradition to 
which Dante's poem is heir, and to which we shall now turn. With its 
emphasis on the psychology of desire, the lyric tradition offers a key and 
underutilized context for understanding Inferno v. 
Giacomo da Lentini's canzone Madonna, dir vo voglio develops in simile 
the analogy between the lover's condition and that of a ship "in mare 
tempestoso" (50); noteworthy with respect to Inferno v, where the souls 
have no hope of posare ("nulla speranza li conforta mai, / non che di posa, 
ma di minor pena" [44-45]), is the dialectic between the restless motion 
of the tempesta on the one hand and, on the other, the lover's attempt to 
reach a different state, that of posare: "posar crio" (64). 15 Likewise, Guido 
delle Colonne, in the canzone Ancor che Vaigua, speaks of his desire as a 
force that puts him in a tempest: "e lo disi'o c'ho lo cor m'abranca, / 
crescemi volontate, / mettemi 'n tempestate" (43-45). Even more inter- 
esting in this regard is another canzone of Guido delle Colonne, Amor, 
che lungiamente m'hai menato, which is in effect a lyric version of Inferno v 
without the eschatological context. The Augustinian dialectic between 
menare and posare (terms that will govern Inferno v as well)16 shapes the 
canzone from the outset, where the compulsive force of love is compared 
not to the roiling force of a gale on the sea but to the severe control of a 
rider on his mount; the lover begs love to loosen the reins by which he is 
so tightly bound: "Amor, che lungiamente m'hai menato / a freno stretto 
senza riposanza, / alarga le toi retene in pietanza" (1-3). The wind and 
sea imagery comes to the fore in the canzone's conclusion, where, as the 
wind beats the waves into a frenzy, so love agitates the lover, giving him 
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no peace: "c'Amor mi sbatte e smena, che no abento, / si come vento 
smena nave in onda" (63-64). Love moves the lover as the wind moves 
a ship; this analogy brings us quite close to the contrapasso of the bufera 
infernal. It is worth noting, moreover, that Dante himself posited the anal- 
ogy between wind and desire, albeit in benign form, in the early sonnet 
Guido, V vorrei, where he wishes to be placed with his friends "in un vasel, 
ch'ad ogni vento / per mare andasse al voler vostro e mio" (3-4). 17 
The theoretical scaffolding behind this imagery, which is spelled out 
crisply by Dante in verse 39 of Canto v, where he defines the carnal 
sinners as those who subordinate reason to desire ("che la ragion sommet- 
tono al talento"), is also present in these early lyrics. While Giacomo 
offers the language of passive surrender to love that Francesca will later 
use (e.g., "como l'amor m'ha priso"; "di tal guisa Amor m'ha vinto" 
[Madonna, dir vo voglio, 2, 72]), Guido delle Colonne, who like Giacomo 
presents love as a force that seizes and overcomes the lover (e.g., "si m'ave 
preso e tolto" [Ancor che I'aigua, 33]; "Amor che vince tutto" [Amor, che 
lungiamente, 24]), more explicitly theorizes the role of reason - 
"senno" - as the counter-weight to passion: 
Forza di senno e quella che soverchia 
ardir di core, asconde ed incoverchia. 
Ben e gran senno, chi lo pote fare, 
saver celare - ed essere signore 
de lo suo core quand'este 'n errore. 
(Amor, che lungiamente m'hai menato, 48-52) 
Elaborating the troubadour topos of fol'amor, Guido delle Colonne writes 
that love causes even the wisest to stray, that he who loves most has least 
judgment or sense of measure and is most "folle": "Amor fa disvi'are li 
piu saggi: / e chi piu ama men' ha in se misura, / piu folle e quello che piu 
s'innamora" (Amor, che lungiamente, 53-55). Here the Judge of Messina 
anticipates Guittone d'Arezzo, the Italian poet who went furthest in ques- 
tioning the courtly view that holds desire desirable at all costs. Guittone 
explicitly repudiates the courtly ethos in his canzone Ora parra s'eo savero 
cantare, where he declares that he flees and diswants love - "Amor fug[g]h' 
e disvoglio" (3) - for where love grips there reigns madness, "follore," 
instead of wisdom: "che 'n tutte parte ove distringe Amore / regge fol- 
lore - in loco di savere" (10-11). 
The commentary tradition is not entirely silent on the subject of ver- 
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nacular subtexts for this section of Canto v; a small but intriguing set of 
references has grown up around "che la ragion sommettono al talento." 
Di Siena's 1867 commentary is the first to mention the similarity between 
verse 39 and a line from a sonnet of Folgore da San Gimignano,18 which 
I will cite in full: 
Quando la voglia segnoreggia tanto 
che la ragion non a poter in loco 
spesse fiate ride 1'uom di pianto 
e de grave doglienza mostra gioco; 
e ben seria de bon savere affranto 
chi fredda neve giudicasse foco; 
simil son quelli che gioi' mostra e canto 
de quelTonde doler devria un poco; 
Ma ben se po coralmente dolere 
chi sommette ragion a voluntade 
e segue senza freno so volere; 
che non e gia si ricca podestade 
com se medesmo a dritto mantenere, 
e seguir pregio, rugger vanitade.19 
Folgore's "chi sommette ragion a voluntade" and Dante's "che la ragion 
sommettono al talento" are strikingly parallel in their use of the construc- 
tion sommettere a, with reason as the direct object of the verb and desire as 
the object of the preposition a. This is a construction that commentators 
have turned up in other texts as well. In 1905 Torraca, claiming that "il 
concetto era antico, la frase dell'uso," cites Cicero, De Officiis, and Tavola 
Ritonda 75: "perch'io non voglio sottomettere la ragione alia volonta."20 
Contini draws attention to a verse of Meo Abbracciavacca: "e qual som- 
mette a voglia operazione."21 The Bosco-Reggio edition of the Commedia 
cites Mazzoni's reference to a passage in Brunetto Latini's Tresor.22 
These citations do indeed illuminate the topical currency of Dante's 
"che la ragion sommettono al talento," while not however venturing 
beyond fairly trite and hackneyed statements of the moral conflict be- 
tween reason and desire. I propose a different intertext, a verse whose 
syntax is different but whose meaning is substantively identical, and whose 
author - Guido Cavalcanti - enormously enriches and complicates our 
understanding of Dante's deployment of "che la ragion sommettono al 
talento" in the context of Inferno v. I refer to "che la 'ntenzione per 
ragione vale," verse 33 of Donna me prega. Using intenzione to signify 
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desire (or the object of desire or, but in this context it amounts to the 
same thing, the representation of the object of desire),23 Cavalcanti states 
that, for a lover, desire takes the place of reason. Although keyed to differ- 
ent registers - one Aristotelian and scholastic, the other more traditionally 
erotic and courtly, with "talento" replacing 
" 
'ntenzione" (it is interesting 
to note that "talento" is the last word of Donna me prega)24 - these two 
verses make essentially the same point. In fact, "che la 'ntenzione per 
ragione vale" is a philosophically more sophisticated way of saying "che 
la ragion sommettono al talento." 
In Donna me prega, Cavalcanti takes that rhetorical staple of the lyric 
tradition, the copula Amore-morte, and endows it with hard philosophical 
value, arguing in lethally sharp technical language that love is a sub-ratio- 
nal force that kills. Having assigned love to that faculty of the soul that is 
"not rational, but which feels" ("non razionale, - ma che sente," 31), in 
other words to the seat of the passions, the sensitive as compared to the 
rational soul, he claims that love removes human judgment from health, 
from the sphere of rationality, that it substitutes appetite for reason, and 
induces lack of discernment: "for di salute - giudicar mantene, / che la 
'ntenzione - per ragione - vale: / discerne male - in cui e vizio amico" 
(Donna me prega, 32-34). Cavalcanti spectacularly concludes this line of 
argument by stating that if reason - the faculty that helps us pursue the 
path contrary to love - is impeded, then from love death will often fol- 
low: "Di sua potenza segue spesso morte, / se forte - la vertu fosse 
impedita / la quale aita - la contraria via" (35-37). For Cavalcanti, in 
other words, love leads us not down the path of life, but down the path 
of death.25 
Now, viewed teleologically, Dante's work and thought are governed 
by one principle: that love is a life-force, and that the life-force is love. 
Love can save, love can beatify, love can give life - these principles are 
the bedrock of the Commedia. If I state the obvious, I do so in order to 
make a point about Inferno v: simply put, it is that Inferno v derives its 
extraordinary importance within the economy of Dante's oeuvre from 
its perverse mirroring of the poet's primal foundational belief. Inferno v 
constitutes Dante's most synthetic and compelling meditation on love as 
a death force, on love as a power that does not defy death but courts it, 
on love as a dark compulsion that - far from leading us toward salvation - 
keeps us, as Cavalcanti puts it, "for di salute." We could say, indeed, that 
Inferno v is the venue in which Dante conducts an in malo exploration of 
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the Commedia s basic premises: the possibility of transcendence through 
love and the salvific mission of the word. And, if Inferno v's profile is 
heightened by its association with a love that leads us down "la contraria 
via" from the one on which Beatrice leads Dante, so is Cavalcanti's, for 
Cavalcanti is the theoretician of that love. 
Looking at these issues from the perspective of Cavalcanti's role vis-a- 
vis the Commedia, two points emerge: 1) our persistent sense of a pervasive 
Cavalcantian presence in the Commedia that goes far beyond explicit cita- 
tions of or referrals to Guido is accurate; and 2) this is so because Guido 
is in fact encoded into the problematic that is Inferno v, and that problem- 
atic is in fact coterminous with the poem.26 1 articulated in nuce the view 
that animates these pages in Dante's Poets: "Whatever our position on the 
question of Cavalcanti's alleged Averroism, so hotly debated by Nardi and 
Favati, there can be no doubt that the love Guido professes in Donna me 
prega is diametrically opposed to the love Dante professes in the Commedia. 
Cavalcanti aligns love and death, Dante love and life; the ending of Donna 
me prega reads like the antithesis of the Paradiso, or rather the Paradiso reads 
like a sustained contradiction of Donna me prega" (144-145). 
From this perspective, Guido is akin to Ulysses - another seeker of 
"canoscenza" (a quintessentially Cavalcantian word) who, proud of his 
"altezza d'ingegno," disdains all help or assistance - in that he is a figure 
whose literal presence in the poem is only the starting point for the den- 
sity of significance that ultimately accrues to him. I would argue, indeed, 
that Dante's Ulyssean mythography is a composite that draws on Guido's 
haughty intellectualism; even more to the point is that the Commedia's 
handling of Guido resonates to its overarching Ulyssean thematics.27 The 
"Da me stesso non vegno" thematic of Inferno x, a canto whose echoing 
of Donna me prega is well recognized, projects onto Guido an arrogant 
self-sufficiency that is emphatically and precisely coded as Ulyssean. Dante 
achieves this view of Guido by pushing Guido's own arguments one step 
further, turning Guido's despair - his belief that love can never afford 
"canoscenza" because of the very nature of what love is - into disdain. 
Thus, Guido is viewed as "disdaining" the object of Dante's quest, 
namely Beatrice: "Da me stesso non vegno: / colui ch'attende la per qui 
mi mena / forse cui Guido vostro ebbe a disdegno" (Inf. x, 6 1-63). 28 
In this way a shared lyric past is invoked in Inferno x (and cemented by 
way of the evocation of Donna me prega in the nome I come I lume rhyme 
words of the passage immediately following the naming of Guido in verse 
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63), a past in which - from Dante's perspective - one poet gave new 
meaning to the salvific and life-giving force of love already conjured by 
Guinizzelli, while the other insisted on the tragic conjunction of love and 
death. Although a Cavalcantian role in Inferno v - a text whose subject is 
none other than "colei che s'ancise amorosa," i.e., the conjunction of 
love and death - is not dependent on specific citations, I believe that 
Donna me prega may be discerned as a precise intertextual presence. The 
canzone tells us that love is formed from darkness ("si formato, - come / 
diaffan da lume, - d'una scuritate" [16-17]), and that, seated in darkness, 
it excludes the light ("assiso - 'n mezzo scuro, luce rade" [68]); the dwell- 
ing of the lustful is twice defined in terms of the total exclusion of light, 
as "parte ove non e che luca" (Inf. iv, 151), and "loco d'ogne luce muto" 
(Inf. V, 28). The agitated purposeless motion of Inferno v evokes Cavalcan- 
ti's description of love as a condition whose essence is excess, absence of 
repose, and the inability to endure for long in any single state: 
L'essere e quando - lo voler e tanto 
ch'oltra misura - di natura - torna, 
poi non s'adorna - di riposo mai. 
Move, cangiando - color, riso in pianto, 
e la figura - con paura - storna; 
poco soggiorna . . . 
(Donna me prega, 43-48)29 
The stanza continues by situating love in "gente di valor" - "ancor di lui 
vedrai / che 'n gente di valor lo piu si trova" (48-49) - a group in which 
Francesca would undoubtedly claim membership. 
Let us return now to the connection between verse 33 of Donna me 
prega, which states that under love's sway desire takes the place of reason, 
and verse 39 of Inferno v, which states that carnal sinners subordinate rea- 
son to desire. The likeness of "che la 'ntenzione - per ragione - vale" and 
"che la ragion sommettono al talento" is evident: although, as I noted 
previously, the verses belong to different stylistic registers, they offer the 
same information about the damaging effects of passion on the alignment 
of human faculties. Both hold that passion takes our faculties out of align- 
ment, permitting desire to govern reason rather than the other way 
around. More significant, however, is the difference between the verses, 
which stems from their contexts and which can be summed up as follows: 
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what Guido says about love, Dante says about lust. What Dante considers, in 
fact, to be the very definition of lust rather than love - carnal sinners 
are defined precisely as those who subject reason to desire - Cavalcanti 
considers to be the very nature of love - all love. So, while we are accus- 
tomed to thinking of Inferno v as a text that forces us to deconstruct 
Francesca's use of the word "amore," a text that, by romanticizing in hell, 
obliges the reader to deromanticize and to learn that what is called love 
may not always be love, even when enveloped in citations from Guido 
Guinizzelli and Andreas Capellanus, we can now see that it is also a text 
that protects and defends love - what Dante would classify as real love - 
from a blanket indictment like that of Cavalcanti. By working to make 
distinctions between different kinds of human impulses popularly grouped 
together under the general rubric "love," Inferno v resists the totalizing 
effect of Cavalcanti's philosophy. Dante's echoes of Donna me prega in 
Inferno v do not confirm the canzone's views, therefore, but resist them. 
But Dante had not always resisted Cavalcanti's views on love, and so 
this intertextual moment also affords us a window onto the struggle waged 
between Dante and Guido, an ideological struggle over Dante's thinking 
about desire in human life, its transcendental dimension or lack thereof - a 
struggle, that is, over Dante's very soul. There was a time when Dante 
employed for himself the language that in the Commedia is employed by 
or about Francesca. Perusing his lyrics in chronological order, we have no 
trouble finding language retroactively reminiscent of Inferno v: 
lo disio che li mena {Degli occhi de la mia donna, 13) 
si ch'io caddi in terra (E' m'incresce di me, 64) 
Lo doloroso amor che mi conduce 
a fin di morte per piacer di quella . . . 
Per quella moro c'ha nome Beatrice . . . 
E allor non trarra si poco vento 
che non mi meni, si ch'io cadrd freddo; 
e per tal verro morto . . . 
Pensando a quel che d' Amore ho provato, 
l'anima mia non chiede altro diletto, 
ne il penar non cura il quale attende: 
che, poi che '1 corpo sara consumato, 
se n'andera l'amor che m'ha si stretto 
con lei a Quel ch'ogni ragione intende; 
e se del suo peccar pace no i rende, 
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partirassi col tormentar ch'e degna; 
si che non ne paventa, 
e stara tanto attenta 
d'imaginar colei per cui s'e mossa, 
che nulla pena avra ched ella senta; 
si che, se 'n questo mondo io l'ho perduto, 
Amor ne l'altro men dara trebuto. 
(Lo doloroso amor, 1-2, 14, 21-23, 29-42) 
onde ha vita un disio che mi conduce . . . 
una giovane entrata, che m'ha preso, 
e hagli un foco acceso . . . 
non sofrrir che costei 
per giovanezza mi conduca a morte 
(Amor, che movi tua vertu da cielo, 20, 25-26, 56-57) 
Ben e verace amor quel che m'ha preso 
e ben mi stringe forte 
(Io sento si d'Amor la gran possanza, 33-34) 
e Amor . . . non m'abbandona . . . 
che li dolzi pensier' non mi son tolti 
la morte de' passare ogni altro dolce30 
(Io son venuto alpunto de la rota, 23, 25, 37, 65) 
si ch'ella non mi meni col suo freddo 
(Amor, tu vedi ben che questa donna, 23) 
E' m'ha percosso in terra, e stammi sopra 
con quella spada ond'elli ancise Dido 
(Cost nel mio parlar voglio esser aspro, 35-36) 
Corre l'avaro, ma piu fugge pace . . . 
Colpa e de la ragion che nol gastiga. 
Se vol dire T son presa,' 
ah com poca difesa 
mostra segnore a cui servo sormonta! . . . 
Vedete come conchiudendo vado: 
che non dee creder quella 
cui par bene esser bella, 
esser amata da questi cotali; 
che se belta tra i mali 
volemo annumerar, creder si pone, 
chiamando amore appetito di fera! 
Oh cotal donna pera 
che sua bilta dischiera 
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da natural bonta per tal cagione, 
e crede amor fuor d'orto di ragione! 
(Doglia mi reca ne lo core ardire, 69, 95-98, 137-147) 
Io sono stato con Amore insieme 
da la circulazion del sol mia nona, 
e so com'egli affrena e come sprona, 
e come sotto lui si ride e geme. 
Chi ragione o virtu contra gli sprieme, 
fa come que' che 'n la tempesta sona 
(Io sono stato, 1-6) 
Chi s'innamora si come voi fate, 
or qua or la, e se lega e dissolve, 
mostra ch'Amor leggermente il saetti. 
Pero, se leggier cor cosi vi volve, 
priego che con vertu il correggiate, 
si che s'accordi i fatti a' dolci detti. 
(Io mi credea del tutto esser partito, 9-14) 
Quale argomento di ragion raffrena, 
ove tanta tempesta in me si gira? 
(Amor, da che convien pur ch'io mi doglia, 26-27) 
This compilation gives us much to consider with respect to the lyric con- 
text of Inferno v, ranging from suggestive phrasings to substantive inter- 
texts. Let us begin with the early canzone Lo doloroso amor. 
The Cavalcantian alchemy of Lo doloroso amor - perhaps one should say 
the hyper-Cavalcantian alchemy, in that Guido himself never addresses a 
congedo to "Morte," as Dante does uniquely in this canzone - is such that 
Beatrice becomes literally an anti-Beatrice:31 
Lo doloroso amor che mi conduce 
a fin di morte per piacer di quella 
che lo mio cor solea tener gioioso, 
m'ha tolto e toglie ciascun di la luce 
che avean li occhi miei di tale Stella, 
che non credea di lei mai star doglioso: 
e '1 colpo suo c'ho portato nascoso, 
omai si scopre per soverchia pena, 
la qual nasce del foco 
che m'ha tratto di gioco, 
si ch'altro mai che male io non aspetto; 
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e '1 viver mio (omai esser de' poco) 
fin a la morte mia sospira e dice: 
'Per quella moro c'ha nome Beatrice.' 
(Lo doloroso amor, 1-14) 
There is no text that more dramatically serves notice of the long path 
Dante had to travel to become the poet whose beloved is an absolute 
principle of life than this canzone's initial stanza, which begins by invok- 
ing love as a force that leads to death - "Lo doloroso amor che mi 
conduce / a fin di morte" - and concludes by affirming Beatrice's role, 
by name (this is the only poem not later included in the Vita Nuova in 
which her name appears), as carrier of death: "Per quella moro c'ha nome 
Beatrice." Fausto Montanari links the lover in Lo doloroso amor to France- 
sea in Inferno v, suggesting that the canzone's lover comes to life again in 
her, specifically in the last stanza's declaration that hell holds no fear for 
him, since with his lady's image before him he will feel no pain: 
che, poi che '1 corpo sara consumato, 
se n'andera l'amor che m'ha si stretto 
con lei a Quel ch'ogni ragione intende; 
e se del suo peccar pace no i rende, 
partirassi col tormentar ch'e degna; 
si che non ne paventa, 
e stara tanto attenta 
d'imaginar colei per cui s'e mossa, 
che nulla pena avra ched ella senta . . . 
(Lo doloroso amor, 32-40) 
Seeing in these verses a challenge that anticipates Francesca's later claim 
to a love that challenges death itself, Montanari writes "Nelle parole di 
Francesca rivive il disperato estremismo della canzone giovanile di 
Dante."32 
"Disperato estremismo" is, of course, an understatement when it 
comes to the rime petrose, poems that offer a template for the dance of 
desire - of motion versus stasis, life versus death - in the unmoving stone 
that must be moved, in the pietra as the icon of inert unmoving "death" 
that is unresponsive to the lover's turgid pressing all too living need. That 
urgent ever unmet desire is expressed in Canto v as a tempest, a whirl- 
wind, in imagery that creates a bridge back to the second stanza of the 
canzone lo son venuto, where too, as Durling and Martinez comment, we 
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find "wind and storm as erotic passion" (224). Inferno v, which seems 
deliberately to recall the incipit of Io son venuto in verse 26's "or son 
venuto," is thus linking itself to a poem that enacts love as death, eros as 
thanatos. For, if the canzone's strophes ring out changes on the topos "it 
is winter, i.e. death, and yet I love, i.e. live," their rhetoric accomplishes 
an inversion, whereby the natural death of winter lives and "true" death, 
so to speak, is associated with the lover. All the pulsating vibrant verbs of 
life belong to the "dead" natural world of the first part of each strophe; 
when we shift to engage the "I" in the conclusion of each strophe, the 
living language gives way to the passive static verbs that qualify the lover, 
whose life/love is more dead than the death of winter. Stanza 2, for exam- 
ple, begins emphatically with "Levasi," a strong verb that describes the 
soaring wind as it rises up: "Levasi de la rena d'Etiopia / lo vento peregrin 
che l'aere turba." The "I" is the mere object in a clause of which trium- 
phant Love, "Amor," whose nets are carried aloft by the conquering 
wind, is subject: "e Amor, che sue ragne / ritira in alto pel vento che 
poggia, / non m'abbandona" (Io son venuto, 23-25; italics mine). 
Francesca, too, uses constructions in which Love is subject and she is 
the passive object. She too says that "Amor . . . non m'abbandona" (Inf. 
v.103, 105). Francesca's "non m'abbandona" is an explicit echo of the 
lover's "non m'abbandona" from the canzone Io son venuto, thus con- 
firming Inferno v's link to the petrose and the canto's status as Dante's 
consummate statement on the choice - what he would consider the Ca- 
valcantian choice - of a love whose never loosening grip is the grip of 
death. The description of the lustful souls as starlings who fly "nel freddo 
tempo" (41) evokes another petrosa, Amor, tu vedi ben, two of whose 
rhyme words are freddo and tempo. The presence of Dido in Canto v 
constitutes yet another link to the petrose, since Dido is named in Cost nel 
mio parlar, in the only reference to Vergil's doomed queen in Dante's 
lyrics. Love beats the lover to the ground, and then stands over him "with 
that sword with which he killed Dido" - "con quella spada ond'elli ancise 
Dido" (36); as in Canto v, Dido is the human matrix on which love and 
death meet. And it is noteworthy that the identical word "ancise" appears 
in both references to Dido, as if Canto v's more succinct "che s'ancise 
amorosa," which suppresses all other agents, whether they be Love or 
Aeneas's sword, and leaves Dido alone with her fate, bears the verbal 
traces of the earlier lyric rendering. The common ground between Inferno 
v and the petrose is a love that is not life - not warmth, not motion, not 
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growth. Like the petrose, Infemo v meditates on a love that - belied by the 
apparent turbulence of the bufera infernal - is ultimately motionless, cold, 
inert, and deadly. For all the restless tumult of the bufera, Canto v ends 
with the stillness of death: "e caddi come corpo morto cade." 
While the petrose ritually enact the love-death, the late sonnet Io sono 
stato argues that there is no withstanding it. Neither reason nor virtue can 
prevail over love, the poem explains; free will is powerless to overcome 
it. Written to Cino da Pistoia most likely between 1303 and 1306, Io sono 
stato accompanies Epistola 3, in which Dante addresses his friend's query 
as to "whether the soul can move from one passion to another" ("utrum 
de passione in passionem possit anima transformari") and replies in the 
affirmative with language that is strikingly reminiscent of Donna me prega: 
"since the concupiscent faculty, which is the seat of love, belongs to the 
sensitive soul, it is manifest that after the corruption of one passion for 
which it is translated into act, it is reserved for another" ("Cum igitur 
potentia concupiscibilis, que sedes amoris est, sit potentia sensitiva, mani- 
festum est quod post corruptionem unius passionis qua in actum reducitur, 
in alium reservatur" [6]).33 Dante will reverse himself later in another 
sonnet to his friend, Io mi credea del tutto esser partito, in which he reproves 
Cino for his changeability and urges him to correct it,34 but in Io sono stato 
and its companion letter volatility in love is a given, since we are under 
love's dominion rather than our own. Moreover, the sonnet makes clear 
that such love applies even to Beatrice; indeed, its opening verses declare 
that Dante first experienced love in his ninth year, thus "implicitly admit- 
ting," as Foster and Boyde comment, "to a carnal love for Beatrice."35 
Using the same metaphor of love as rider (implicitly lover as mount) that 
we saw in Guido delle Colonne's "Amor, che lungiamente m'hai 
menato / a freno stretto senza riposanza," Dante describes love reining 
him in and spurring him on, dominating reason and free will: 
Io sono stato con Amore insieme 
da la circulazion del sol mia nona, 
e so com'egli affrena e come sprona, 
e come sotto lui si ride e geme. 
"Sotto lui si ride e geme" not only recalls Donna me prega, where love 
changes "riso in pianto," but places the lover squarely "beneath" love, 
"sotto," so that he is literally sommesso, to use the verb that in Infemo v 
characterizes the lustful, "che la ragion sommettono al talento." In the 
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comparison that follows, the attempt to withstand passion with reason or 
virtue is as futile as the attempt to make oneself heard during a tempest: 
"Chi ragione o virtu contra gli sprieme, / fa come que' che 'n la tempesta 
sona" (5-6). It is impossible not to think of Francesca, who speaks to the 
pilgrim during a brief respite in the buffeting violence of the infernal 
wind: "noi udiremo e parleremo a voi, / mentre che '1 vento, come fa, ci 
tace" (Inf. v, 95-96). The lovers of Inferno v are reminiscent of the lover 
of Io sono stato, with the crucial difference that they are condemned for 
having allowed their reason to be vanquished, while he is not. Far from 
being condemned, his behavior is justified, for within love's domain free 
will ("liber arbitrio") has no power; in fact, it is not free ("franco"), and 
our deliberative faculty ("consiglio") fights in vain to resist love's domin- 
ion: "Pero nel cerchio de la sua palestra / liber arbitrio gia mai non fu 
franco, / si che consiglio invan vi si balestra" (9-11). 
The impotence of reason when faced with an ineluctable passion is 
reaffirmed, and again laced with tempest imagery, in Dante's last great 
Cavalcantian testament to a deadly eros, the so-called canzone montanina. 
Here, in Amor, da che convien pur ch'io mi doglia, the lover asks how reason 
can restrain where such a tempest whirls within: "Quale argomento di 
ragion raffrena, / ove tanto tempesta in me si gira?" (26-27). This can- 
zone accompanied Epistola 4, to Marchese Moroello Malaspina, appar- 
ently written circa 1307-1308, in which Dante describes how "Amor 
terribilis et imperiosus me tenuit"(3) - "terrible and imperious love holds 
me." He is constrained against his will: "in order that my soul not rebel 
against him again, love bound my free will, so that it is necessary for me 
to turn not whither I, but whither he, wants. So love reigns in me, with 
no virtue opposing him" ("ne contra se amplius anima rebellaret, liberum 
meum ligavit arbitrium, ut non quo ego, sed quo ille vult, me verti opor- 
teat. Regnat itaque Amor in me, nulla refragante virtute" 4-5). The terri- 
ble and imperious love sung by these poems resurfaces in the story of 
Paolo and Francesca, whose unopposable passion leads not only to 
death - as in the lyrics - but also to damnation. Never are these views 
disavowed more explicitly than in Purgatorio xvm, where the strong state- 
ment of free will's dominating role in all moral transactions suggests a 
desire to discredit Io sono stato. A textual link is the sonnet's "consiglio" 
and the canto's "virtu che consiglia" (Purg. xvm, 62), noted by Foster 
and Boyde.36 Moreover, while the sonnet's protagonist is a steed ridden 
by love - but not by "giusto amor" - in Purgatorio xvm the purging souls 
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are ridden - cavalcati - by their good will and just love: "cui buon volere 
e giusto amor cavalca" (96). 37 
But we do not have to await the Commedia to find a condemnation of 
the views espoused by Io sono stato. Roughly contemporaneous with Io 
sono stato and Amor, da che convien is the canzone Doglia mi reca ne Io core 
ardire, whose indictment of passion ungoverned by virtue and reason in- 
habits a moral framework that is highly suggestive vis-a-vis the Commedia. 
(The chronology of these poems, wherein the ideologically "regressive" 
Amor, da che convien is accorded the latest date, suggests the fierceness of 
Dante's internal struggle; these are not matters that he resolved once and 
for all without ever looking back, but an arena to which he was called 
again and again.) The argumentation that in the Commedia will be mar- 
shaled to refute Io sono stato is already advanced in Doglia mi reca; although 
the context is avarice, not lust, the argument works in the same way, as I 
have demonstrated previously, for both are sins of excess desire.38 In fact, 
the point of the canzone is to show the commonality of all sins of desire, 
and the necessity of constraining all desire by reason; to this end, Dante 
systematically links carnal desire to desire for wealth, thus exploding the 
courtly ethos that would privilege love over baser desires and illuminating 
their common ground in concupiscence. 
Like the lover of Donna me prega and the lustful souls of Inferno v, the 
avaricious miser of Doglia mi reca is characterized by continuous futile 
motion, absence of repose, lack of peace: "Corre l'avaro, ma piu fugge 
pace" (69). (Donna me prega contributes to Dante's agenda of contamina- 
tion between lust and avarice on more than one count, if we consider 
that Cavalcanti defines love's essence as excess, "oltra misura," using a 
term - misura - that Dante, following both Aristotle and Guittone, uses in 
Doglia mi reca and Infemo vn to denote correct or incorrect deployment of 
desire vis-a-vis material goods.) Continuing to anticipate Infemo v, Doglia 
mi reca tells us, in its critique of the miser's unruly passion, that the fault 
lies in the insufficient exercise of reason: "Colpa e de la ragion che nol 
gastiga" (95). The canzone continues: if reason were to offer as justifica- 
tion for her poor performance the excuse that she is overcome, possessed 
by desire - "Se vol dire T son presa' 
" (96) - she merely demonstrates 
the weakness of her resistance, since the master should not be overcome 
by the servant: "ah com poca difesa / mostra segnore a cui servo sor- 
monta!" (97-98). 
The image of a segnore (reason) who has been sormontato by his servo 
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(desire) is a reversal of the image implicit in "che la ragion sommettono 
al talento"; while Inferno v offers the image of reason "under" desire, and 
the canzone offers the image of desire "over" reason, the point regarding 
the misalignment of our faculties is the same. Moreover, the language 
used in Doglia mi reca for being possessed by desire - 'T son presa" - is 
the language of the lyric tradition: we remember, for instance, Giacomo's 
"como 1'amor m'ha priso," Guido delle Colonne's "si m'ave preso e 
tolto," and Dante's "Ben e verace amor quel che m'ha preso / e ben mi 
stringe forte" from the canzone Io sento si d'Amor la gran possanza (33- 
34). 39 It is Francesca's language: "Amor, ch'al cor gentil ratto s'apprende, / 
prese costui" (100-101), "Amor, ch'a nullo amato amar perdona, / mi 
prese" (103-104). Indeed, it is the quintessential language of desire, used 
in the great explication of love of Purgatorio xvm, where the discourse of 
desire - the lyric discourse of desire - receives its positive gloss: "cosi l'a- 
nimo preso entra in disire / ch'e moto spiritale, e mai non posa / fin che 
la cosa amata il fa gioire" (31-33). Here possession ("preso"), motion 
("moto"), lack of rest ("mai non posa" recalls "La bufera infernal, che 
mai non resta") culminate not in death but in fulfillment and joy, not in 
"e caddi come corpo morto cade" but in "fin che la cosa amata il fa 
gioire." 
I have argued elsewhere that Doglia mi reca is not merely "Dante's 
canzone on avarice," as it has been labeled by the commentary tradition, 
but rather an expansive meditation on desire that in key respects lays the 
groundwork for the Commedia; I will now elaborate some specific points 
of contact between Doglia mi reca and Inferno v. It is useful in this context 
to view Doglia mi reca against the backdrop of a Guittonian canzone that 
greatly influenced it, Ora parr a s'eo savero cantare; both are moral canzoni 
that are explosively anti-courtly and that deal with the interaction be- 
tween reason and desire, with the result that the differences between them 
are highly instructive.40 
Guittone begins by repudiating love. He pits love against reason: "che 
'n tutte parte ove distringe Amore / regge follore - in loco di savere" 
(10-11). He redefines love as "carnal voglia" (21). He recommends that 
we follow not love, but "honored Wisdom" - "orrato Saver" - and God: 
Ma chi cantare vole e valer bene 
in suo legno a nochier Diritto pone 
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e orrato Saver mette al timone, 
Dio fa sua Stella . . . 
(Oraparra, 16-19) 
Noting that neither honor nor good can be attained by pursuing "carnal 
voglia," Guittone recommends a life of abstinence from vice and willing- 
ness to toil; only so can one advance one's "stato ad onore" (26). A 
bourgeois ethic of God-centered savere thus replaces the follore of the 
courtly paradigm. In Doglia mi reca, on the other hand, Dante does not so 
much replace the courtly paradigm as correct it, insisting that we distin- 
guish one impulse called love from another. While in Ora parra Guittone 
sustains the total incompatibility of love and reason, in Doglia mi reca 
Dante argues that where there is not reason, there cannot be real love, 
that what is called "love" in such a case is not love, but bestial appetite. 
While Guittone rejects the very idea of human love existing on a higher 
plane, saying in effect that what people call "amor" is always "carnal 
voglia," Dante makes it clear that love that accords with reason and virtue 
does exist, and that it is up to us to distinguish such love from carnal voglia. 
Dante arrives at his anatomy of love by a negative path, an anti-courtly 
diatribe that refuses to exculpate women from their share of blame in 
matters of love. He begins Doglia mi reca by insisting that it is a woman's 
duty to deny her love to a man who cannot match in virtue what she 
offers in beauty, and castigates women for the "vil vostro disire" (6) that 
could prompt them to love unworthy men: 
che la belta ch'Amore in voi consente, 
a vertu solamente 
formata fu dal suo decreto antico, 
contra '1 qual voi fallate. 
(Doglia mi reca, 7-10) 
In the seventh and final stanza Dante once more addresses the ladies, 
saying that he has accomplished his mission, in that he has unveiled for 
them the baseness of their male admirers: "Disvelato v'ho, donne, in alcun 
membro / la vilta de la gente che vi mira" (127-128). Given that a wom- 
an's potential lover is vicious, "a union of vice" ("In ciascun e di ciascun 
vizio assembro" [132]), the love that results can only be turbid and con- 
fused ("per che amista nel mondo si confonde" [133]), since the good of 
the woman requires a corresponding good from the man to draw forth 
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love: "che l'amorose fronde / di radice di ben altro ben tira" (134-135). 
Love, properly understood, is inseparable from virtue; where there is no 
corresponding good, there is no love. A woman could only consider her- 
self loved by men like these if she redefined love, giving the name of love 
to what is mere bestial appetite: "chiamando amore appetito di fera" 
(143). Such a woman should perish, since she disjoins her beauty from 
natural goodness and believes love to be "outside of reason's garden": 
Oh cotal donna pera 
che sua bilta dischiera 
da natural bonta per tal cagione, 
e crede amor fuor d'orto di ragione. 
(Doglia mi reca, 144-147) 
This final stanza of Doglia mi reca is crucial for our topic, for it adum- 
brates one of the fundamental issues of Inferno v, namely whether the use 
of the name "love" is sufficient guarantee that we are in fact talking of 
love. Dante is concerned with human desire, but also with how we use 
language when we deal with desire. Francesca talks repeatedly of "love," 
but the narrator instructs us otherwise, using different words ("carnal," 
"desire"), when he tells us that we will be encountering "peccator 
carnali, / che la ragion sommettono al talento." Similarly, Doglia mi reca 
raises the possibility that someone who desires - a woman who desires, no 
less! - could define love in a self-serving way, could justify her actions by 
calling her appetite by the name of love. As with Francesca, although she 
may use the word amore, she misapplies the signifier, for the impulse that 
grips her is in fact an "appetito di fera." Her mistake comes from the fact 
that she believes that love is disjoined from reason; literally, she "believes 
love to be outside reason's garden": "e crede amor fuor d'orto di ragione" 
(147). 
These are very important verses, critical for understanding Dante's ma- 
ture view of human love. They do not tell us, as Gagliardi holds, that 
"Oltre ad 'amore appetito di fera' non c'e altro" (86). Rather, as in the 
Commedia, Dante offers us a choice: appetite divorced from reason, mis- 
takenly called love, versus appetite in accord with reason, correctly called 
love. The fact that there is a choice is underscored by the verb credere: the 
lady "crede amor fuor d'orto di ragione"; she believes love to be disjoined 
from reason. From Dante's perspective, she is wrong. The very idea of an 
appetite, mistakenly called love, that is instead "bestial" and "outside of 
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reason's garden," allows us to postulate its converse: it allows us to con- 
jure that which may correctly be called love, an appetite that is human 
rather than feral and that resides within reason's garden. In other words, 
what Dante does in Doglia mi reca is what he does in Inferno v and Purgatorio 
xviii: insist on the crucial role of reason as the arbiter of human desire, 
whether in malo or in bono. Dante does not say, in Doglia mi reca, that "II 
desiderio di per se e vile";41 his point is, as it is in the Commedia, that 
desire becomes evil when it triumphs over reason. These verses supply 
the crucial discriminant between types of love, or more properly between 
lust and love, namely reason, the faculty that renders us human rather 
than bestial. The anatomy of love that results, with its two opposing cate- 
gories - amore appetito difera versus amore d'orto di ragione - will find con- 
firmation in the Commedia, where love is not rejected or replaced, but 
reconceptualized. 
One could say, then, that Dante rejects both Guittone's and Cavalcan- 
ti's formulations, since in very different ways both view love negatively. 
Guittone moralistically condemns "amore" as "carnal voglia," holding 
that when love is present, reason is absent ("che 'n tutte parte ove dis- 
tringe Amore / regge follore - in loco di savere"). His is a bourgeois 
Italian variation of the old troubadour model of recantation and retire- 
ment to a monastery: he rejects love and love poetry but he does not 
reject secular life. Cavalcanti concludes - despairingly but not moralisti- 
cally - that love belongs to the seat of the passions, is divorced from the 
intellect, and can never lead to canoscenza. His is a newer position, philo- 
sophical but not didactic, which offers a rationalistic pessimism with re- 
gard to love in human life. Both poets divorce love from reason. In this 
essential respect, both stand in sharp opposition to Dante, who considers 
the presence of reason to be the indispensable guarantee of that which is 
truly love, and not lust. Poetic affect further complicates the picture, for 
Dante is passionate about the role of reason, in a precise inversion of 
Cavalcanti, who is cool about passion. In Doglia mi reca, an irascibly pas- 
sionate poem, Dante sketches the outlines of the situation we find in 
Inferno v: a courtly lady who keeps using the word "amore" to refer to 
what can only have been an "appetito di fera," given that it existed "fuor 
d'orto di ragione." It is the responsibility of the lady in Doglia mi reca to 
distinguish between lovers, and to make sure that she is not "amata da 
questi cotali" (140), desired by the men of vice whom the canzone has 
savaged. If she does give her love to such a man, disjoining her beauty 
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from virtue, she deserves to perish. "Oh cotal donna pera" says the can- 
zone - and Francesca does indeed perish, killed with her lover on earth 
and damned for all eternity after her death. 
Death brings us back to Cavalcanti and to the last of Francesca's three 
great Amor verses, the only one not to possess a Guinizzellian pedigree: 
"Amor condusse noi ad una morte" (106). It is here that Francesca in- 
scribes the true rubric of Canto v, whose topic is not just sinful love but 
the love that leads to death. This is the love of which one could say - with 
Cavalcanti (in what may constitute yet another intertext between Donna 
meprega and Inferno v) - "Di sua potenza segue spesso morte" (35). Caval- 
canti seals Francesca's canto, his language bringing its dispassionate and 
quiet power to the end oilnfemo v. The last verses of Inferno v are a tissue 
of Cavalcantiisms: "Mentre che l'uno spirto questo disse, / l'altro piangea; 
si che di pietade / io venni men cosi com' io morisse" (139-141). Al- 
though we are in the Commedia and therefore talking of two discrete 
historical souls, we could as well be in that dim Cavalcantian penumbra 
of fractured interior space where "uno spirto questo disse," "l'altro pian- 
gea," and the "I" to which both spirits belong swoons as to death from 
the pity and anguish of his self's utter dispossession. Nor is a Cavalcantian 
frame of reference out of place with respect to the actual souls described in 
these verses: Paolo seems very like the quintessential Cavalcantian lover's 
persona, so alienated from himself that he has lost his voice. While the 
canto's final verse echoes some of Dante's early lyrics - "si ch'io caddi in 
terra" from E} m'incresce di me and "si ch'io cadro freddo / e per tal verro 
morto" from Lo doloroso amor - and substitutes for the Cavalcantian deli- 
cacy of the preceding verses a more Dantesque vigor, it too contributes a 
Cavalcantian stamp: how can we resist hearing "Cavalcanti" in the re- 
peated "ca" sounds of "caddi come corpo morto cade"? 
Finally, though, in the same way that Dante uses Vergil to deviate from 
Vergil through his deployment of Minos, so he uses Cavalcanti to go 
beyond Cavalcanti. I mean "go beyond" most literally, in the sense of 
Dante's going beyond Inferno v, and removing himself from the Cavalcan- 
tian space of love and death. Inferno vi begins with the pilgrim's recovery 
from the swoon caused by the pity and sorrow he experienced at France- 
sca's story; upon regaining consciousness, he becomes aware of new sights 
all around him: 
novi tormenti e novi tormentati 
mi veggio intorno, come ch'io mi mova 
e ch'io mi volga, e come che io guati. 
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Io sono al terzo cerchio, de la piova 
etterna, maladetta, fredda e greve; 
regola e qualita mai non l'e nova. 
(Inf. vi, 4-9) 
I have singled out these verses before, as paradigms of the Commedia's 
poetics of the new, noting that: "For [the pilgrim] alone, in hell, there are 
'novi tormenti e novi tormentati' (Inf. vi, 4), 'nove travaglie e pene' (Inf. 
vii, 20), 'nova pieta, / novo tormento e novi frustatori' (Inf. xvm, 22-23). 
For the sinners, instead - as for the angels, but for opposite reasons, and 
with opposite results - there is no difference, nothing is ever new: 'regola 
e qualita mai non l'e nova' (Inf. vi, 9)."42 
What is interesting, in our present context, about these classic verses of 
comedic upward mobility is that they are derived from Guido Cavalcanti, 
the poet of zero mobility: Contini points out the echo of Cavalcanti's 
"una paura di novi tormenti," from the sonnet Perche nonfuoro a me gli 
occhi dispenti.43 So Dante has reworked Guido's fear - his friend's paralyz- 
ing "paura di novi tormenti" - into his own relentless forward motion; 
after all, the "novi tormenti" of Canto vi have a positive connotation for 
the protagonist, not being his. Rather, he revels in the resurgent strength 
of that unbridled present tense: "mi veggio intorno, come ch'io mi 
mova / e ch'io mi volga, e come che io guati. / Io sono al terzo 
cerchio. . . ." He is not stuck with Francesca, stuck with the "novi tor- 
menti," in the space of Canto v, the space of love and death, anymore 
than he will be stuck with anyone else he meets along the way. And, 
perhaps, there is a final Cavalcantian echo, not picked up by Contini: the 
verse that describes the deathly stasis of hell, "regola e qualita mai non l'e 
nova," seems to me imprinted on a periphrasis for love in Donna meprega, 
where love is "La nova - qualita" (49). If so, then - in a transformation 
that accurately sums up Dante's thoughts on what Guido had to say in his 
great canzone - Cavalcanti's love has become Dante's hell. 
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NOTES 
1 . Francesca's precept is a conflation of two verses from Al cor gentil: onto the incipit, which 
formulates a causal relationship between love and inborn nobility, is grafted the first verse of the 
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second stanza, "Foco d'amore in gentil cor s'aprende," which introduces the element of love as a 
kindling fire. See Teodolinda Barolini, Dante's Poets: Textuality and Truth in the 'Comedy' (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 4-7 (also available as It miglior fabbro: Dante e i poeti 
delta 'Commedia' [Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993]). 
2. The one exception of which I am aware is Grandgent, who comments as follows: "In some 
previous tales of Hell a wind torments evildoers, notably in the Visio Alberici, xiv, where souls are 
driven by the fiery breath of a dog and a lion. Dante divests the torment of all grotesqueness, and, 
indeed, treats the sinners of this class with special consideration. This may be due in part to sympathy, 
and partly, no doubt, to a sense that their fault is the result of a mistaken following of love, the noblest 
of human emotions." See La Divina Commedia, comm. C. H. Grandgent, rev. Charles S. Singleton 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), xx. 
3. The quotation is from Eileen Gardiner's introduction to her edition, Visions of Heaven and Hell 
before Dante (New York: Italica Press, 1989), xvii. Citations from the visions will be from this edition. 
4. Under cauda, the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (Lipsia: Teubner, 1906-1912), vol. 3, offers an 
entry illatiore sensu hominumfy and gives references to Cicero's Epistles and Horace's Satires (627). 
Illustrations of Minos in Inferno v may be found in Illuminated Manuscripts of the 'Divine Comedy' by 
Peter Brieger, Millard Meiss, and Charles Singleton (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1969), 2:79-90. Minos's tail appears phallically from between his legs in plate a on page 82 
(London B.M. Additional 19587), plate b on page 87 (Madrid B.N. 10057), plate a on page 88 (Paris 
B.N. it. 74), plate a on page 89 (Paris B.N. it. 2017), and plate a on page 90 (Paris B.N. it. 78). My 
thanks to Karl Fugelso for his expert guidance in deciphering these illustrations. 
5. While this essay reads Canto v in a nongendered way (as is indeed not only canonical but 
hermeneutically fundamental), I believe that a gendered reading can supplement our understanding 
of what is at stake for Dante in this canto. I attempt such a reading in "Dante and Francesca da 
Rimini: Realpolitik, Romance, Gender," Speculum, lxxv (2000), 1-28. When I say, then, that 
Dante's treatment of lust is desexualized and even, by contrast with the visions, degendered, I do not 
mean to suggest that his choice of a female protagonist is casual or unimportant. 
6. See Aeneid vi, 441-442, where we read of the "Lugentes Campi" where dwell those "quos 
durus amor crudeli tabe peredit." The translation of Vergil's verse is that of Allen Mandelbaum, The 
Aeneid of Vergil (New York: Bantam, 1972). 
7. Castelvetro notes that the judge should be situated in the area preceding Limbo, so that no 
soul remains outside the purview of justice: "dovendosi ragionevolmente far il giudicio in luogo 
separato, e non solamente in luogo separato, ma per aventura nell'anzilimbo, accioche niuna anima 
restasse, che non avesse il suo luogo assegnato e certo per dirittura di giudicio." See Sposizione di 
Lodovico Castelvetro a XXIX Canti dell' 'Inferno' dantesco (Modena: Societa tipografica, 1886) 73. 
8. This symmetry has not, to the best of my knowledge, been picked up by the commentators. 
Padoan comments on the "Lugentes Campi" as a gloss for "molto pianto" in verse 27: "Sono i 
virgiliani 'Campi lugentes' (Aen. vi 441), in cui l'esegesi medievale dtWEneide riconosceva gli 'errores 
luxuriae,' collocandovi appunto, con Didone, le anime dei lussuriosi." See La Divina Commedia: 
Inferno i-viii, ed. Giorgio Padoan (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1967). 
9. For more on this feature, see my "Minos's Tail: The Labor of Devising Hell (Inf. v, 1-24)," 
Romanic Review, lxxxvii (1996), 437-454. 
10. In Boccaccio's tale Francesca is effectively innocent of any misdeed, since her father deceives 
her into wedlock with the ugly Gianciotto through the use of the handsome Paolo as a proxy for his 
brother. Picked up by subsequent commentators, Boccaccio's melodramatic tale has achieved canoni- 
cal status and has utterly contaminated the reception of Francesca's story. See my "Dante and France- 
sca da Rimini" for further discussion of and bibliography regarding Boccaccio's Francesca. 
11. See the gloss on sommettere offered in the Endclopedia Dantesca, 6 vols. (Roma: Istituto dell'En- 
ciclopedia Italiana, 1970-1978): "Piu che nel senso oggi vulgato di 'sottomettere,' 'soggiogare,' il 
verbo era usato nell'italiano dell'epoca di Dante come contrario di 'sovrapporre,' 'preferire' (in senso 
traslato); dunque 'mettere in secondo piano,' 'subordinare,' 'considerare di minore importanza' ris- 
petto a qualcosa, cioe con insita l'idea di paragone; e questo il caso di Ifv 39" (5:314). 
12. The Nichomachean Ethics, tr. David Ross (1925; rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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1980). Aristotle's examples of compulsion - "if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by 
men who had him in their power" - resonate not only for Inferno v but also for Piccarda in Paradiso 
in. Her story, according to which "men had her in their power," precipitates a lengthy meditation 
on the will and compulsion. 
13. Guido da Pisa, Expositiones et Glose super 'Comediam' Dantis or Commentary on Dante's 'Inferno', 
ed. Vincenzo Cioffari (Albany: SUNY Press, 1974), 101. 
14. Of course, Augustine's terminology is redolent with that of previous thinkers. Speaking of 
the term pace and its significance in Dante's canzone Doglia mi reca ne lo core ardire, Antonio Gagliardi 
derives it from Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics: "Pace e termine strategico e porta con se un sistema 
concettuale. Soltanto con la pace, con la fine del desiderio, c'e felicita. Non pud esserci sommo bene 
e felicita nel desiderio senza fine e senza pace. II testo aristotelico per la definizione del sommo bene 
(Etica Nicomachea . . .) e presente nel suo termine piu significativo"; see Guido Cavalcanti e Dante: una 
questione d'amore (Catanzaro: Pullano, 1997), 80. 
15. Citations of Giacomo da Lentini, Guido delle Colonne, and Guittone d'Arezzo are from 
Poeti del Duecento, ed. Gianfranco Contini, 2 vols. (Milano: Ricciardi, 1960). 
16. Menare defines the effects of the bufera on the souls of Canto v: not only "mena li spirti con 
la sua rapina" (32), but "di qua, di la, di giu, di su li mena" (43). Later in the canto the allegory that 
applies menare to a physical bufera rather than to a metaphysical force is breached, and menare ap- 
plies - as in Guido delle Colonne - explicitly to amor and dish: "per quello amor che i mena" (78), 
"quanto disio / mend costoro al doloroso passo" (113-114). The noun posa appears in verse 45, 
"non che di posa, ma di minor pena," while pace is used by Francesca twice, in verses 92 and 99. 
17. Dante's lyrics are cited from the edition Dante's Lyric Poetry, ed. Kenelm Foster and Patrick 
Boyde, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). However, while Foster and Boyde follow 
Barbi and Maggini in taking "ad ogni vento" to mean "whatever wind may blow" (see Michele 
Barbi and Francesco Maggini, eds., Rime della 'Vita Nuova' e della giovinezza [Firenze: Le Monnier, 
1956], 193), I prefer Contini's llvasel che viaggia con ogni vento" (see Gianfranco Contini, ed. Rime, 
2nd. ed. [Torino: Einaudi, 1970], 35). As the sonnet goes on to say, tempests and foul weather will 
provide no impediment; the winds will be consonant with their desires, which are temperate, amica- 
ble, benign. Guglielmo Gorni notes the presence in Inferno v of these verses from Guido, i' vorrei in 
"Francesca, o la cognizione del dolore: riscritture nel quinto delTJ«/emo," Anticomodemo, vol. 1 
(Roma: Viella, 1997). 
18. "Dopo Dante, il Petrarca: 'Che sommettete la ragione ai sensi.' Ma innanzi ad entrambi 
questi nostri grandi poeti, Folgore da San Gemignano, che fiori nel 1260, avea scritto in un sonetto: 
'Che sommette ragione a volontate.' Nel fango dei versi di questo rimatore, l'Alighieri razzolo, dice 
il Monti, qualche granello d'oro" ('Commedia' di Dante Allighieri con note di Gregorio di Siena: 'Inferno' 
[Napoli: Perrotti, 1867-1870]; cited from the Dartmouth Dante Project). In 1921 Carlo Steiner 
offers more: "Chi sommette rason a volontate - E segue senza freno suo volere: Folgore da San Gemignano, 
Son.: Quando la voglia" {'La Divina Commedia' commentata di Carlo Steiner [Torino: G. B. Paravia, 
1921], 47). Also in 1921 Casini-Barbi include the reference: "II Torraca cita opportunamente parec- 
chi riscontri di scrittori medievali; tra gli altri, questi della Tavola ritonda, cap. 75: 'Io non voglio 
sottomettere la ragione alia volonta,' e di Folgore, son. xxx: 'Chi sommette rason a volontade' 
" {'La 
Divina Commedia' di Dante Alighieri con il commento di Tommaso Casini, rinnovata e accresciuta per cura di 
S. A. Barbi [Firenze: Sansoni, 1921; rpt. 1965], 41). 
19. / Sonetti, ed. Ferdinando Neri (Torino: UTET, 1925); italics mine. In the introduction Neri 
refers to the same study by Monti that had caught Di Siena's eye: "Quanto ai riscontri tra Folgore e 
Dante, asseriti dal Monti, essi si limitano pur sempre al verso 'chi la ragion sommette a volontade' 
{Inf. v, 39 'che la ragion . . .'), d'un sonetto che pud essere, o no, di Folgore" (15, note 1). 
20. Torraca is quoted according to the Dartmouth Dante Project, La Tavola Ritonda from the 
edition of Di Filippo-Luigi Polidori (Bologna: Gaetano Romagnoli, 1864), 276. 
21. Poeti del Duecento, 1:337. 
22. Tresor 2.20.6: "On doit contrester au desirier de delit; car ki se laisse vaincre, la raisons 
remaint sous le desirier" (ed. Francis J. Carmody [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948], 
191). 
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23. Domenico De Robertis glosses la 'ntenzione as follows: "il desiderio ('intendanza' vale, nel 
linguaggio della poesia amorosa, sia 'amore,' sia per metonimia, l'oggetto amato): cfr. Conv., m xv 
8-9, dove a 'desiderio naturale' corrisponde e equivale 'intenzione naturale'; o anche 1' 'intentio 
fonnae,' ossia la rappresentazione sensibile dell'oggetto amato (1' 'intentio individui' di Averroe nel 
suo commento al De anima, n, t.c, 65), Timmagine che l'amante se ne fa. Ma il verso e evidentemente 
'ispirato' dalla clausola di Giovenale, Sat., vi 223, 'sit pro ratione voluntas' (Contini, Lett. d. Or.), del 
resto probabilmente presente anche a Guittone del son. Franchezza, segnoria . . . , 9, 'ma franco e quei 
la cui voglia e ragione' 
" (102). See De Robertis's edition of Guido Cavalcanti, Rime, con le rime di 
Iacopo Cavalcanti (Torino: Einaudi, 1986); all citations are from this text. Mario Marti, in Poeti del 
Dolce stil nuovo (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1969), glosses: " 'ntenzione' e qui l'atto e la condizione dell'in- 
tendere; dunque, appetito" (187). Ferdinando Pappalardo paraphrases thus: "L'amore dunque, in 
quanto appetito, procede dalla virtu sensitiva delTanima, o meglio dalla conoscenza sensibile: e la sua 
essenza e tale da ofruscare il retto gjudizio della ragione, distogliendola dal suo fine naturale e benefico 
{for di salute - -giudicar mantene), perche all'esercizio di questa facolta si sostituisce l'impulso cieco del 
desiderio sensibile (che la 'ntenzione - -per ragione vale). . . . intenzione sta infatti qui a significare la 
rappresentazione che si ricava dalla conoscenza delle qualita sensibili, e che costituisce l'oggetto del- 
l'appetito sensitivo"; see "Per una rilettura della canzone d'amore del Cavalcanti," Studi e problemi di 
critica testuale xm (1976), 47-76, quotation page 64. 
24. It is worth noting that the congedo of Donna me prega juxtaposes ragione and talento, referring 
to the canzone's argument ("ragione") and its lack of desire ("talento") to consort with "persone" 
who do not possess "intendimento." Although ragione and talento do not here possess the moral 
significance that they have in "che la ragion sommettono al talento," it is intriguing to see them 
together: 
Tu puoi sicuramente gir, canzone, 
la 've ti piace, ch'io t'ho si adornata 
ch'assai laudata - sara tua ragione 
da le persone - c'hanno intendimento: 
di star con l'altre tu non hai talento. 
They appear together in the canzone's first stanza as well: 
Ed a presente - conoscente - chero, 
perch'io no spero - ch'om di basso core 
a tal ragione porti canoscenza: 
che senza - natural dimostramento 
non ho talento - di voler provare . . . 
(Donna me prega, 5-9; italics mine here and above) 
25. Interestingly, Corrado Bologna notes the recurrence of words from these verses of Donna me 
prega in Inferno l, including "morte," "forte," "impedita," and "contraria via": "i rimanti-chiave 
danteschi con cui s'inizia il poema sono gia determinati, si vorrebbe dire ideologicamente e contrario, 
dalla Reimbildung di Cavalcanti"; see H ritomo di Beatrice: simmetrie danteschefra 'Vita Nova', 'Petrose' e 
'Commedia' (Roma: Salerno, 1998), 32. 
26. My formulation could be taken as an elaboration of the memorable conclusion of Gianfranco 
Contini's classic essay, "Cavalcanti in Dante," where he writes "Cavalcanti aveva salato il sangue a 
Dante"; see Un'idea di Dante (Torino: Einaudi, 1970), 143-157. Contini offers one Cavalcantian 
intertext for Inferno v: "Se Merck fosse arnica a' miei disiri ispira a Francesca 'Se fosse amico il re de 
l'universo' " (155). On the intertextual presence of Cavalcanti in the Commedia, see Dante's Poets, 
especially 123-153, and now the lexically rich but hermeneutically scarse contribution of Nievo Del 
Sal, "Cavalcanti in Dante 'comico' ", Rivista di letteratura italiana, ix (1991), 9-52. Much attention 
has been devoted recently to the Cavalcanti-Dante node, mosdy to the relationship between the Vita 
Nuova and Donna me prega; see the Bibliographical Note in conclusion to this essay. 
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27. On the Commedia's Ulyssean thematics, see Teodolinda Barolini, The Undivine 'Comedy': 
Detheologizing Dante (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992) chapter 3 and passim. 
28. This is my understanding of these verses, for which I have argued in Dante's Poets, page 146, 
note 66: "My interpretation of line 63 is, of course, apparent from my translation, in which I have 
rendered "cui" not as "quern" (i.e. Vergil), but as "ad eum quern," or, if we follow Dante in 
historicizing the Signifier as a woman, "ad earn quam" (the argument as to whether Beatrice or God 
is intended is a spurious one, since they amount to the same thing; however, in that Dante and Guido 
share a past as love poets, and Beatrice is that localized version of the divine that Dante chose and 
Guido refused to discover within love poetry, she would seem the more appropriate choice)." 
29. In her gloss of these verses Maria Corti discusses the contaminatio between philosophical and 
lyric discourses in Donna me prega: "NelTAnonimo Giele si legge che l'anima sensitiva, in preda 
all 'appetitus e al desiderium 'movet corpus . . . nee est illo motu mota per se, sed per accidens,' cioe se e 
'alterata a sensibilibus extra.' Si noti la coincidenza con 'Move, cangiando - color, riso in pianto' del 
v. 46, dove il cambiamento di colore o il passaggio dal riso al pianto sono postille poetiche e della 
tradizione lirica al movet corpus del filosofo (con questo non si vuol ignorare Fesistenza del verbo 
'muovere' nella lingua della poesia, la dove si descrivono gli effetti di amore, ma solo fare presente il 
caricarsi di significato dei termini dovuto all'incontro della tradizione con il nuovo pensiero filo- 
sofico)." See Lafelidta mentale (Torino: Einaudi, 1983), 30. 
30. Robert M. Durling and Ronald D. Martinez argue convincingly for the reference to orgasm 
in this verse (see Time and the Crystal: Studies in Dante's 'Rime Petrose' [Berkeley: University of Califor- 
nia Press, 1990], 102). I see no reason, however, to restrict morte to only one meaning here. 
31. The uniqueness of this congedo, the only one in which Dante addresses "Morte," seems to 
have escaped the commentators, although Foster and Boyde do note that "The apostrophe to death 
is a nice variation on the traditional congedo, in which the poet addresses his song" (2:76). Foster and 
Boyde argue against a Cavalcantian presence in this canzone: "despite the insistence on love as male, 
dolore, morte, and in spite of the account of the departure of the soul from the body (as again in E' 
m'incresce), the poem is not specifically Cavalcantian: there are no spirits, no mind, no personified 
sighs, no dramatization of the psyche, no dialogue, no scientific subtlety, and above all there is no 
dolcezza in the style" (2:72-73). I disagree with this assessment: while the style of Lo doloroso amor is 
not Cavalcantian, the ideology most certainly is. 
32. See "Dalla canzone 'Lo doloroso amor' a Francesca da Rimini," in L'esperienza poetica di 
Dante, 2nd ed. (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1968), 207-226; quotation 214. Foster and Boyde also note 
the parallel: "It is worth remarking that the situation imagined here is, in one significant respect, very 
similar to that of Paolo and Francesca: as the poet's soul will be in hell for ever accompanied by the 
love he has felt on earth, so the souls of the two damned lovers are for ever accompanied by their 
love (Inf. v, 103-5) - with the difference of course that the latter are each really, not merely in 
imagination, present to one another (ibid. 135); and also that they are nevertheless suffering (ibid. 
44-45); whereas for the young Dante - not, as yet, much concerned with theological consistency - 
the state of damnation could be imagined as painless" (2:75). 
33. Epistole, ed. Arsenio Frugoni and Giorgio Brugnoli, in Dante Alighieri, Opere minori, vol. 5, 
tomo ii, La letteratura italiana: Storia e testi (Milano: Ricciardi, 1979). 
34. The relevant verses are interesting also for language that Dante will draw on in Inferno v: 
Chi s'innamora si come voi fate, 
or qua or la, e se lega e dissolve, 
mostra ch'Amor leggermente il saetti. 
Pero, se leggier cor cosi vi volve, 
priego che con vertu il correggiate, 
si che s'accordi i fatti a' dolci detti. 
(Io mi credea del tutto esser partito, 9-14; italics mine) 
"Or qua or la" will be echoed in "di qua, di la, di giu, di su li mena," while the characterization of 
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the lover as "light" surfaces in the description of Paolo and Francesca, who "paion si al vento esser 
leggieri" (Inf. v, 75). 
35. Dante's Lyric Poetry, 2:323. They comment further: "This is the more remarkable in that 
Dante is now about forty years old and has behind him not only the Vita Nuova with its story of an 
entirely sublimated 'heavenly' love, but also the series of canzoni that more or less directly celebrated 
a love that had its seat in the mind or intellect" (323). 
36. Foster and Boyde comment that the "consiglio" of the sonnet is "the act of 'la virtu che 
consiglia' 
" in Purgatorio xvm, 62. I agree with their statement that a comparison of lo sono stato with 
Purgatorio xvm "strongly suggests that the carefully reasoned affirmation of free will in the latter text 
was made with the [sonnet's] denial of free will (where erotic stimuli at least are concerned) in mind" 
(2:324). 
37. It is perhaps worth noting that the verb cavalcare, whose past participle cavalcati is but one 
consonant short of the name Cavalcanti, appears in the Commedia only here and in Purgatorio xxiv, 
the canto in which Dante coins the name of and defines for posterity the ultimately anti-Cavalcantian 
dolce stil novo. The verb appears in the simile used to describe Forese's departure: "Qual esce alcuna 
volta di gualoppo / lo cavalier di schiera che cavalchi ..." (94-95). 
38. This discussion draws on my 1997 reading of Doglia mi reca as a meditation on desire that 
deliberately, following Guittone's lead, conflates lust (carnal desire) with avarice (material desire); see 
"Guittone's Ora parra, Dante's Doglia mi reca, and the Commedia's Anatomy of Desire," Seminario 
Dantesco Intemazionale: International Dante Seminar 1, ed. Zygmunt Baraski (Firenze: Le Lettere, 1997), 
3-23. Also in 1997 appeared Antonio Gagliardi's book, Guido Cavalcanti e Dante: una questione d'a- 
more, noteworthy for the importance it gives to Doglia mi reca and for the similarity of our perspectives 
(but not of our subsequent readings): Gagliardi believes that "Doglia mi reca si pud ritenere la risposta 
di Dante alia canzone di Guido" (72), and holds - correctly - that in Doglia mi reca "Dante costituisce 
un'ermeneutica parallela tra l'amore e l'avarizia" (78). However, in accord with his view of Dante as 
a dualist, a "negatore deU'amore" (32), Gagliardi profoundly misreads the canzone as denying all 
value to human love, establishing "un'ermeneutica negativa di qualsiasi desiderio funzionale all'eros" 
(73). I will return to this point further on. 
39. In his reading of Canto v Francesco Torraca offers the following opportune citation from Re 
Enzo: "Cosi mi stringe amore / ed hammi cosi priso, / in tal guisa conquiso, / ch'en altra parte non 
ha pensamento"; see "II canto v dell'Inferno," 1902, rpt. Studi danteschi (Napoli: Francesco Perrella, 
1912), 424. 
40. For a fuller treatment of the impact of Guittone's canzone on Doglia mi reca, see my "Guit- 
tone's Ora parra, Dante's Doglia mi reca, and the Commedia' s Anatomy of Desire," where I argue that 
Dante learns from Guittone the key move of conflating lust with avarice. 
41. Gagliardi, 74. Precisely because there is much that is admirable in Gagliardi's book, including 
his bringing Doglia mi reca into play in a discussion of this sort, it is important to point out that he 
misconstrues Dante's text, even with respect to its literal meaning. 
42. The Undivine 'Comedy', 23-24. 
43. Contini writes that " 'paura di novi tormenti' si riflette nei 'Novi tormenti e novi tormentati' 
del canto di Cerbero (con cui, nella prima bolgia, 'novo tormento e novi frustatori')"; see Un'idea di 
Dante, 155. 
Bibliographical Note: Vita Nuova and Donna me prega 
Much of the material that has accumulated recently on Dante and Ca- 
valcanti has been devoted to the relationship between the Vita Nuova and 
Donna me prega, with a view to suggesting that Cavalcanti intended his 
canzone as a "reply" to the libello. This thesis was put forward in 1993 by 
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Giuliano Tanturli, "Guido Cavalcanti contro Dante," in Le tradizioni del 
testo: Studi di letter atura italiana qfferti a Domenico De Robertis, ed. Franco 
Gavazzeni and Guglielmo Gorni (Milano-Napoli: Ricciardi, 1993), pp. 
3-13. Tanturli builds his argument on a weak foundation, namely the 
assumption that Dante in the Vita Nuova speaks of Guido with an "aria di 
perfetta intesa" (8), that as a result Dante could harbor no polemical intent 
vis-a-vis his friend, and that - given the formal echoes between the two 
texts - the polemicist had to be Cavalcanti, responding to Dante's chal- 
lenge: "L'intenzione di Dante non e di contrapporsi alTamico, ma di 
coordinarsi, o meglio, di coordinare lui a se. La polemica contraddirebbe 
non solo l'atteggiamento, ma l'intenzione del libro nei suoi confront!" 
(8). But the intentionality of any text, let alone of a text as opaque as the 
Vita Nuova vis-a-vis the man it labels "primo de li miei amici" but also 
casts as precursor John the Baptist to Dante's resurgent Christ, is far less 
transparent than Tanturli assumes. In response to Tanturli, Giorgio Inglese 
correctly points out that the Vita Nuova already indicates a divergence 
between Dante and Guido - "Tra l'autore della Vita nuova e il suo desti- 
natario si percepisce un distacco" - and prudently notes that further preci- 
sion as to the degree, intentionality, and trajectory of that divergence 
cannot be reconstructed from the data at hand: "che esso [il distacco] gia 
corrisponda, - in piena coscienza dell'uno, deU'altro  di entrambi, - alia 
distanza obiettiva che corre fra la dottrina del 'libello' e quella esposta in 
Donna meprega, - questo non si potra affermare (perche Dante ne tace), e 
non si potra negare, perche le effective dichiarazioni di 'intesa' fra l'autore 
della Vita nuova e il suo primo amico non consentono la conclusione"; 
see " '. . . ilia Guidonis de Florentia Donna me pregd (Tra Cavalcanti e 
Dante)," Cultura neolatina, lv (1955), 179-210, quotation 182. Nonethe- 
less, the theory of Donna meprega as reply to the Vita Nuova is put forward 
again, more assertively, by Enrico Malato in Dante e Guido Cavalcanti: l
dissidio per la 'Vita Nuova' e il (disdegnoy di Guido (Roma: Salerno, 1997), a 
book that has stimulated considerable discussion, including a review arti- 
cle by Nicolo Pasero, "Dante in Cavalcanti: ancora sui rapporti fra Vita 
nuova e Donna meprega" Medioevo romanzo, xxn (1998), 388-414. 
Taken as a whole, this investigation is troubling, for it offers the specta- 
cle of philology degrading into pseudo-philology. The ideological rupture 
between Dante and Cavalcanti is a given. So, within an arena whose 
parameters have long been fully established (no one doubts the ideological 
split between the two), an enormous amount of "philological" energy is 
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devoted to establishing what cannot be established (a precise chronology 
for the dissidio between them). Since no amount of formalist comparison 
will yield a definitive chronology, the discussants are driven to base their 
arguments on opinions (which in themselves are perfectly legitimate, but 
not when presented as though philology), like Tanturli's opinion regard- 
ing the "perfetta intesa" between the two friends. Another example: in 
order to break the impasse regarding the chronology of the two texts to 
which his excellent formal analysis leads, Pasero appeals to Donna me pre- 
ga's character, noted by Tanturli, as more a refutation than a demonstra- 
tion, and derives from the canzone's adversative nature its polemical 
stance toward the Vita Nuova: "Nel caso dei nostri due testi, lo statuto di 
testo polemizzante compete a Donna me prega piuttosto che alia Vita 
nuova - ce lo confermano anche le reiterate dichiarazioni 'awersative' del 
testo cavalcantiano, spesso sottolineate dalla critica" (412). But - even 
putting aside the fact that the Vita Nuova is polemical enough in its own 
right, with or without adversatives - there is no reason that the target of 
Cavalcanti's refutation needs to be the Vita Nuova: he could be aiming at 
any number of unknown targets, such as a text we do not have, or a 
fellow poet with whom he had conversed. Indeed, his target could, quite 
plausibly, be himself: he could be correcting the much more optimistic 
view of love taken, for instance, in his ballata, Veggio negli occhi della donna 
mia. 
Finally, it is troubling to see the opacity of these texts violated so will- 
fully. It is one thing to solicit a text, to probe it for meanings that are not 
immediately evident; we do this, as literary critics, and our readers let us 
know if they find our speculations compelling. But it is quite another to 
mount entire psychodramas on their backs, as Malato does: "La serie dei 
testi esaminati, dunque, dimostra come, contrariamente a quanto si e a 
lungo ritenuto, non sia mancata una 'reazione' da parte di Guido alTof- 
ferta della Vita nuova: nettamente negativa, di rifiuto, dettato forse dal 
fastidio (o dal risentimento) del 'primo amico' per il suo coninvolgi- 
mento - ritenuto probabilmente abusivo, o comunque per lui inaccettabi- 
le - in una situazione e in una dimensione ideale alia quale egli si riteneva 
del tutto estraneo" (65). Even less acceptable is to claim as established that 
which is conjecture. This Malato does when he constructs an argument 
that is one conjecture after another in order to use Dante's Poscia cWAmor 
and Vox die 'ntendendo to date Donna me prega and then claims to "aver 
stabilito che non solo la grande canzone di Guido non proceda la Vita 
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nuova e non possa essere stata presente a Dante quando elaborava il suo 
'libello,' ma che, al contrario, Donna me prega segua quest'ultimo, lo pre- 
supponga, e . . . sia stata anzi addirittura pensata e scritta allo scopo di 
contestare Pideologia rappresentata nelT operetta dantesca" (53). That 
Dante and his early friend were ultimately ideologically opposed we 
know, but no amount of strong talk will allow us, with the knowledge 
we currently have, to determine the exact sequence of action and reaction 
through which the rupture occurred. 
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